WORLD WAR II - NONFICTION
"Patton At Bay" by John Nelson Rickard
This is a good tactical account of the Lorraine campaign, from September to December 1944, that stresses problems in
Third Army Command. The basic factors stalling the Third Army advance were the lack of fuel in September - the one
incipient breakthrough was contained by a counterattack by Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army - and the weather and the
more organized German defense in depth in November. Rickard makes some good points in that Patton fixated too much on
taking Metz and failed to push his subordinates enough in November. He certainly "snapped out of it" when called upon
to attack into the left flank of the German advance at the Bulge, and it is hard to find fault with Patton's advances
in the Rhineland in the spring or with his Rhine crossing. One of the strengths of the book, in comparison to the
official Army history, is that it discusses the personalities and military histories of both the American and the German
commanders. The operations in this book should be studied in comparison to the other "slugfest" operations of the time
- the Hürtgen Forest campaign of the First Army and the clearing of the approaches to Antwerp by the Canadians.
One wonders how much more difficult further advance would
have been if the Germans had not concentrated all their best units in the Ardennes where they were basically wasted in
futile attacks on an inadequate road system by Hitler trying to recreate his success in 1940.
A question that the book fails to ask, but I find intriguing, is what would have happened if Patton had swapped the two Corps
commanders in November, putting Eddy in charge of the infantry assaults around Metz, and Walker in charge of the armored advance
east of Nancy? Would Walker have pushed enough to force a breakthrough?
Reviewed by Jim Gilbert 9/15/2000
Praeger Publishers
88 Post Road West
Westport, CT 06881
