"Clashes
- Air Combat Over North Vietnam 1965-1972"
by Marshall L. Michel
III
This book is an excellent account of the "corporate" deficiencies of the USAF in the late 60's and early 70's. The deficiencies of the air-to-air missiles in the Vietnam war are strikingly similar to the deficiencies of the torpedos in the USN in the first two years of WWII. Equally striking was the smug attitude of the service about the superiority of US aircraft ("The F-86 had a 13:1 kill ratio over the MiG-15. Who cares that they slaughtered the F-84s?") and the poor pilot training that occurred for both USAF and USN F-4 drivers. The MiG-21 was indeed a nasty surprise. With a higher thrust-to-weight ratio and a lower wing loading, it could both out-accelerate and out-turn F-105s and F-4s. The only American advantage was a higher clean top speed, and external ordinance stores and fuel tanks often abrogated this. The MiG-21 had poor visibility, and a short range, but was an excellent point defense interceptor that transitioned well from bomber defense to dog fighting. (As an aside to the book, with modern electronics, the MiG-21/Lancer and MiG-21/2000 are excellent low-cost fighters today, but each air-air missile will cost you as much as the airframe!)
The book details both the combat adaptations that worked (jamming pods, IFF interrogators) and the effective efforts of the USN and criminal negligence of the USAF (and I write as an ex-USAF officer) to improve dog fighting capabilities between the end of Rolling Thunder in 1968 and Linebacker I/II in 1972. The Navy instituted the Top Gun school and made effective modifications to the AIM-9 Sidewinder - the Air Force made a couple of ineffective changes to the AIM-9 and some moderately good ones to the AIM-7, though much of the better performance of the latter during Linebacker was due to higher engagement altitudes resulting from the use of laser guided bombs for the strike packages.
He does make the point in the end that the USAF attitude improved
after Vietnam when the junior officers of that war increased in
seniority and that the introduction of AWACS and trading top speed
for maneuverability and visibility in the new generation of fighters
cured many of the deficiencies seen in the Vietnam war. A minor
objection is that the book does not refer to officers below general
rank by name.
Available from:
Naval Institute Press (Classics of Naval Literature)
118 Maryland Avenue
Annapolis, MD 21402-5035
800-233-8764
Reviewed by Jim Gilbert, 26 April 1999
